The EU and the Kosovo Challenge by Collantes-Celador, G. et al.
Collantes-Celador, G. (2008). The EU and the Kosovo Challenge. In: Mediterranean Yearbook 
2008. (pp. 163-167). Barcelona: CIDOB Foundation/IEMed. 
City Research Online
Original citation: Collantes-Celador, G. (2008). The EU and the Kosovo Challenge. In: 
Mediterranean Yearbook 2008. (pp. 163-167). Barcelona: CIDOB Foundation/IEMed. 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/13844/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Gemma Collantes Celador
Post-Doctoral Research Fellow
Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI),
Barcelona
2007has been a year of crucial changes for Kosovo, par-
ticularly in relation to the ongoing debate over its future
status as a sovereign territory. This debate was marked
by various diplomatic attempts to bring the two parties
– Serbia and Kosovo – to a common position, namely
through the Ahtisaari plan and the Troika process. The
failure of these initiatives confirmed thatwhatever the out-
come of the status talks, the future of Kosovo continued
to depend on international assistance, with the onus in-
creasingly falling on the EU as it identifies the Western
Balkans as belonging to its realm of responsibility. As a
result, the year 2007 also constitutes a key year in the
EU’s preparations for yet another new step in its grow-
ing role in the region, best exemplified by the prepara-
tions to launch the largest civilian European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission to date: the Euro-
pean Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX
Kosovo). This articlewill analyse themain events that took
place in 2007. In particular, these events confirmed that
Kosovowill be a notable challenge for a EuropeanUnion
eager to show that its security and defence mecha-
nisms are ready to tackle difficult conflict scenarios.
The Diplomatic Game
The year 2007 witnessed another set of efforts by
the international community to bring closer the two
opposing views on the future of this territory, with very
limited success.
The Ahtisaari Plan
In November 2005 Martti Ahtisaari, former Finnish
President, was appointed UN Special Envoy for the
future status process for Kosovo. After over a year
of direct talks, bilateral negotiations, expert consul-
tations involving the leadership of both Serbia and
Kosovo, and the delay caused by parliamentary elec-
tions in Serbia, his conclusions were rather bleak. In
his March 2007 “Comprehensive Proposal for the
Kosovo Status Settlement” (commonly known as
the Ahtisaari plan or Settlement proposal), he admit-
ted that the situation is hostage to,
“categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade
demands Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia, while
Pristina will accept nothing short of independence
[…] it is my view that the negotiations’ potential to
produce anymutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo’s
status is exhausted. No amount of additional talks,
whatever the format, will overcome this impasse.”
(UN 2007b: 2).
The status situation at the time – as outlined in
Resolution 1244 – was nevertheless deemed unten-
able by the Settlement proposal.1 The status quo was
negatively impacting on Kosovo’s democratic devel-
opment, accountability, economic recovery and inter-
ethnic reconciliation. The only way out from this
impasse was – according to Ahtisaari – to support
the conditional independence of Kosovo with inter-
national supervision until the territory enjoyed the local
capacity to ensure a “viable, sustainable and stable
[Kosovo] in which all communities and their members
can live in a peaceful and dignified existence” (UN
2007b: 2).
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1 Resolution 1244 respected the territorial integrity of Serbia but introduced the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to prepare Kosovo for seff-
government, pending a political settlement on its future status. This new situation meant that Serbia did not exercise any legislative, executive and
judicial authority over the territory of Kosovo. All these powers rested with the transitional administration that UNMIK represented (UN 1999).
The temporary international supervision recommend-
ed by the Ahtisaari plan was to be exercised by an
International Civilian Representative, double-hatted as
EuropeanUnion Special Representative, acting as the
ultimate supervisory authority over the implementa-
tion of the Settlement proposal. The mandate of this
figure would be complemented by an ESDP mission
in the rule of law area; a NATO-ledmilitary force to pro-
vide a safe and secure environment throughout Kosovo,
just as the Kosovo Force (KFOR) had been doing since
1999; and finally, an OSCE mission to assist in the
monitoring process of the Plan’s implementation. The
temporary international presence should be inten-
sively engaged in institutional capacity-building in addi-
tion to enjoying strong but focused powers in critical
areas such as community rights,2 decentralisation,3 the
protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the
rule of law. These powers, which extended as far as
the capacity to annul decisions/laws and remove pub-
lic officials, should be exercised when the Kosovo
authorities “contravene the provisions of theSettlement
proposals and the spirit in which they were crafted”
(UN 2007b: 4). In other words, these powers should
be “corrective” rather than prescriptive.
The Ahtisaari plan was killed by fruitless negotia-
tions with Belgrade, which rejected it, while the Kosovo
Albanians fully endorsed it. It was also hostage to
irreconcilable differences between the USA and all
the members of the EU (some of which had to be
coaxed) on the one side and Russia on the other,
which explains the UN Security Council’s failure to
draft a resolution to implement the Settlement pro-
posal. Russia, an ally of Serbia, was worried of the
precedent Kosovo could set for other secessionist
regions, such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia or
Transdniestria. The USA, on the other extreme, even
declared at one point Kosovo’s right to declare inde-
pendence unilaterally and immediately.
The Troika Process
At the end of July 2007 a new round of negotiations
began. This was the result of the ongoing differences
in the UN Security Council over Kosovo’s future sta-
tus, and agreement among the six-nation Contact
Group on the need to move the process out of its
stalemate situation.4 This new initiative, mediated by
a “Troika” of representatives from the EU, Russia
and US, was meant to provide one last chance to
Belgrade and Pristina to find a common solution.
The Troika reported back in December 2007with poor
results (UN 2007a). Neither side was still willing to
compromise on the status issue. The Troika proposed
a fourteen-point assessment – as a basis for evalua-
ting a range of solutions – that outlined a variety of
parameters bywhich common bodieswould be estab-
lished to implement cooperation between Serbia and
Kosovo. This would come in exchange for Serbia’s
commitment not to govern or re-establish a physical
presence onKosovo’s territory or to interfere in Kosovo’s
access to international financial institutions and its path
towards EU integration. At the sameKosovowasmeant
to commit to full regional integration, particularly on the
economic side (ICG2007: 3).Coined “Ahtisaari-minus”
by the Kosovo media, this assessment was not con-
sidered seriously by the Kosovo authorities. They were
only open to discussing post-independence arrange-
ments with Serbia, had little trust in the negotiation
process and were more concerned at the time with
their November 2007 general elections.5 Serbia was
similarly dismissive of the Troika assessment, insisting
on Kosovo remaining within Serbia but with substan-
tial autonomy and with no return to the pre-March-


















The Ahtisaari plan was killed by
fruitless negotiations with
Belgrade, which rejected it,
while the Kosovo Albanians fully
endorsed it. It was also hostage
to irreconcilable differences
between the USA and
all the members of the EU
2 Non-majority communities in Kosovo were in effect provided with a veto over laws of particular interest to their communities in areas such as
language, culture, education and symbols (UN 2007b: 6).
3 The Plan envisaged offering Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo enhanced municipal competences in areas such as healthcare, higher edu-
cation, local courts and the selection of the police chief; considerable autonomy over their financial matters, including the capacity to receive
funding from Serbia; and the establishment of six new or significantly expanded Kosovo Serb-majority municipalities (UN 2007b: 7).
4 The Contact Group is an informal grouping of influential states (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US) interested in the stabilisa-
tion of the Balkans.
5 These elections gave the victory to Hasmim Thaçi, former leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), who was determined to make Kosovo
independent as soon as possible.
With the Troika reporting back its lack of success in
finding a negotiated solution, the conditional or super-
vised independence proposed by the Ahtisaari Plan
was back on the table as the best way forward. In
fact, as it became clearer that the Troika process
would not yield positive results, the Kosovo authori-
ties began to devise alternative ways of moving towards
independence – even without UN Security Council
authorisation – in close cooperation with those
Western states ready to support them. As summed
up by the International Crisis Group, the alternative
was not an option:
“Accepting paralysis is not a viable option, however.
It would lead to an uncoordinated, unsupervised, pos-
sibly violent independence process that could stim-
ulate instability in Kosovo’s neighbour countries. It
would also seriously damage both the UN’s pres-
tige and the EU’s development as a major political
actor in the global stage” (ICG 2007: i)
EULEX Kosovo
In the conclusions of the outgoing Portuguese
Presidency of the European Union, the Council
thanked the Troika for its efforts, regretted the fail-
ure to find a negotiated solution and concluded
that the diplomatic avenue was exhausted. It also
endorsed the UN Secretary-General’s statement that
the status quo in Kosovo was unsustainable and con-
sequently made it clear that the EU was committed
to “assist Kosovo in the path towards sustainable
stability, including by an ESDP mission and a con-
tribution to an international civilian office as part of
the international presence” (Council of the European
Union 2007: para.70). At the same time, the Council
advised Serbia to fulfil the requirements to fully
integrate into the “family of European nations” (Council
of the European Union 2008: para. 71).6 The General
Affairs and External Relations Council was therefore
invited in December 2007 to begin working on the
modalities that such a mission should take, while the
EU Secretary-General/High-Representative Javier
Solana assisted the process by acting as interlocu-
tor between the EU and the responsible authorities
in Kosovo and the UN.
On the basis of thework completed by the EUPlanning
Team for Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) established in April
2006, the activation of the EUmission has since taken
place swiftly. On 16th February 2008 the Council of
the EU decided to launch EULEX Kosovo, the EU
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. Headed by Yves de
Kermabon, this mission aims to support the Kosovo
authorities in building a sustainable and functional
Rule of Law system on the basis of an initial two-
year mandate which will probably have to be expand-
ed. Themissionwill include approximately 1,800/1,900
international police officers, judges, prosecutors
and custom officers and 1,000 local staff to assist
the Kosovo authorities in themaintenance and improve-
ment of the rule of law. For example, EULEX Kosovo
is supposed to ensure that serious crimes are prop-
erly investigated and prosecuted and the outcomes
of that process enforced.
This EU mission is meant to take over from the UN
once Kosovo’s new constitution comes into force
on 15th June 2008. However, following the same
argumentative line adopted in the transition from the
UN to the EU in Bosnia, the Union has made it clear
that its mission will not substitute for UNMIK (UN
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) and thus
will not emulate its executive style. Rather, it should
be seen as a completely new mission designed on
the basis of co-ownership of the process. It will only
monitor, mentor and advise on all areas of the rule of
law, with specific projects – as already outlined by
EUPT Kosovo – designed and implemented in con-
sultation with the appropriate local stakeholders so


















6 The European Union signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia at the end of April 2008, as well as offering special changes
to the visa regime. The European Commission insists that these concessions are completely separate from Kosovo’s recent independence (17th
February 2008).
EULEX Kosovo mission aims to
support the Kosovo authorities
in building a sustainable and
functional Rule of Law system.
For example, it is supposed to
ensure that serious crimes are
properly investigated and
prosecuted and the outcomes of
that process enforced
tunities, while enhancing the transparency of the EU
mission. The only exceptions to this ownership rule
are the handling of special types of crimes (such as
organised crime, war crimes, etc.) and, if needed, riot
control where a more executive role by the EU mis-
sion might be needed until the local authorities are
able to carry out such tasks by themselves.
The rule of law focus of EULEX Kosovo responds to
an international perception of the situation in Kosovo
as being characterised, still, by a serious lack of secu-
rity, the absence of which leads in turn to a lack of
development. However, the rule of law mandate of
this mission cannot by itself solve some of the other
pressing problems that are associated with Kosovo,
even if the lack of security is at the basis of many of
them. According to a March 2008 report from the
European Commission, some of the most serious
problems in Kosovo go from strengthening the rule
of law (particularly the judiciary) to combating organ-
ised crime and corruption, supporting economic devel-
opment and the creation of jobs, improving condi-
tions for the return of refugees and for minority
communities, and enhancing dialogue and reconcil-
iation among communities (European Commission
2008: 7). In the words of Yves de Kermabon:
“Everything in Kosovo is very political, but of course,
the police, the justice system and the borders are at
the heart of the problem and our mission: to estab-
lishing a law-abiding state. Then again, the economy
and the schools should not be forgotten. That’s not
my mission … But they represent two more impor-
tant challenges for Kosovo and onwhich the success
of our mission will depend.” (Europolitics, 2008: 24)
This security-development logic explains the multifac-
eted approach the Union has envisaged for Kosovo, of
which theESDPmission is simply oneelement in awider
policyshapedby theStabilisationandAssociationProcess
or, in other words, the EU’s strategic framework for the
WesternBalkans region. The enhancedEUpresence in
Kosovo is composed of three arms that together utilise
the Union’s full array of political, economic and securi-
ty instruments. EULEX Kosovo represents the opera-
tional arm with political guidance provided by the
International Civilian Office/European Union Special
RepresentativeOffice (ICO/EUSR) that under the lead-
ership of Peter Feith is meant to represent the interna-
tional community under European guidance. This office
is also meant to oversee the transfer of responsibilities
fromUNMIK to the local authorities, and to thenew inter-
national authority, as well as the implementation of the
Settlement proposal outlined by Martti Ahtisaari in his
March 2007 document. The third and last arm is that of
the European Commission’s long-term efforts in the
areasof economicdevelopment, regional integration and
theEUperspective for Kosovo. The latter is to takeplace
through the European partnership, political and techni-
cal dialogue under the Stabilisation and Association
Process Tracking Mechanism and related Community
assistance programmes.7 The EU presence will be fur-
ther complemented by some of the proposals outlined
in the Ahtisaari plan, including an international military
presence (providedbyNATO), assistance fromanOSCE
missionwithextensive fieldpresence, andcapacity-build-
ing efforts by a variety of partners, including the UN
Development Programme, the World Bank and the
Council of Europe.
Concluding Remarks: Kosovo in the EU Era
The year 2007 has been crucial, not only in moving
away from the status quo established in Kosovo by
Resolution 1244 but also in making Kosovo more of
a European issue. While the EU should be praised
for its determination to acquire a more prominent role
in this conflict, its decisions carry a level of resilience
that is already being put to the test. Indeed, at the
time of writing, only a few months into the year 2008,
the Union is confronted with two main challenges.
At the international level, Russia’s useof itsweight in the


















7 As part of its supervision of Pillar IV of UNMIK (on Reconstruction and Economic Development), since 1999 the EU has been active in the area
of macroeconomic reforms. Its actions have also been influenced since 2002 by the decision not to integrate Kosovo into Serbia’s Stability and
Association Process (SAP), leading to regular meetings between the Commission, UNMIK and Kosovo’s provisional authorities on the territory’s
progress in complying with the Copenhagen criteria and the SAP. In the period since 1999 the EU had channelled over € 2 billion through its
various instruments (Sebastián 2007: 4).
The year 2007 has been crucial,
not only in moving away from
the status quo established in
Kosovo by Resolution 1244 but
also in making Kosovo more of
a European issue
1244 is posing serious problems in the handover of
responsibilities from the UN to the EU aswell as inhibit-
ing Kosovo’s integration into the full range of UN insti-
tutions. Some have begun to talk of a “readjustment” of
the transition plans (between the UN and EU) and oth-
ers of “the international community in confusion” (John
2008). The underlying fear is that the outcome could
be a de facto “soft partition” between “UNMIKland” in
Serb-populated areas in the north and “EULEXland” in
the rest of Kosovo,mainly populatedby ethnicAlbanians
(John 2008). This fear is influenced by local events that
have reinforced the claims of those critics questioning
EULEX’s capacity to implement its mandate.
On 17th February 2008 Kosovo declared itself inde-
pendent against the wishes of Serbia and Russia.8
Protests, violence in areas where Kosovo Serbs live
and at the border with Serbia, and the boycott by eth-
nic Serbs of key institutions built during the UN peri-
od (such as the police) to show their refusal to recog-
nise the new Kosovo authorities, are clear illustrations
of the tense situation that has rapidly developed on the
ground. In fact, the Serb-held enclaves (and the north
of Kosovo) operate as part of Serbia (Judah 2008).
This situation is certainly not expected to improve in
the near future as illustrated by Serbia’s decision to
hold its 11th May local and parliamentary elections in
those areas. If uncontrolled, these tensions could turn
Kosovo into a frozen conflict. Facedwith a total absence
of Serb interlocutors (both in Kosovo and in Serbia
itself), and with the inability to establish itself in the
north,9 it remains to be seen how EULEX, and the EU
more generally, will be able to assist in the implemen-
tation of the Ahtisaari Plan, particularly the decentral-
isation clauses that pertain to Serb-populated areas.
The stakes are indeed very high. Tackling appropri-
ately the challenges that have developed since the
end of 2007 is crucial not only for the future of Kosovo,
but also for that of the EU as an effective international
actor in the resolution of conflicts.
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